Endogenous input price and collusion sustainability in the output market by Capuano, Carlo & Grassi, Iacopo
   
 
 
 
Volume 38, Issue 2
 
Endogenous input price and collusion sustainability in the output market
 
Carlo Capuano 
University of Naples Federico II
Iacopo Grassi 
University of Naples Federico II
Abstract
We analyze collusion sustainability in a duopoly where firms compete on quantities, labor is the only input, and the
wage is endogenously defined by the match between the industry labor demand and an upward-sloping labor supply.
In this framework, the equilibrium wage is positively correlated with the industry level of output and, to expand
production, firms have to attract additional employees offering them a higher wage. We prove that the more sensitive
to the industry demand of labor the wage is, the higher is the industry critical discount factor, i.e. the harder it is to
sustain collusion. Thus, when the equilibrium wage is very sensitive to the industry demand of labor, punishment in
the Nash reversion stage may be not credible; this makes collusion never sustainable.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical literature has analyzed numerous factors that may a¤ect the ability
of rms to collude when an implicit agreement must be self-enforcing. These fac-
tors include, for example, demand uctuations, multi-market contacts, number
of rms, capacity constraints, piracy.1
Some literature analyzes how employment protection legislation, unions,
monopsony, or oligopsony in the labor market, a¤ect competitiveness in the
output market.2 Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, very few literature
has analyzed the e¤ect of input market characteristics on collusion sustainabil-
ity.3
This note contributes to this literature focusing on the case where labor is
the only input in a production function with constant return to scale. In this
framework, in order to expand production, rms have to attract additional em-
ployees by o¤ering them higher wages. Therefore, any increase in output causes
a twofold increase in the production costs. The input demand increases, and
the wage increases, as well. Thus, the higher the sensitivity of the equilibrium
wage to the industry demand of labor, the higher the increase in the total cost
of production when a rm decides to produce more.
Focusing on collusion sustainability, we prove that the sensitivity of the equi-
librium wage to the industry demand of labor negatively a¤ects the incentives to
deviate and punish by Nash reversion. We show that in a duopoly à la Cournot:
(i) the more sensitive wages are to the industry demand of labor, the higher it
is the industry critical discount factor, i.e., the harder it is sustaining collusion;
(ii) when the equilibrium wage is very sensitive to the industry demand of labor,
punishing cheater rms in the Nash reversion stage may not be credible, and
this makes collusion non sustainable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
setting; in Section 3, we analyze tacit collusion as a Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE); in Section 4, we discuss theoretical conclusions and policy
implications.
2 Model setting
Consider a duopoly for homogenous goods with symmetric rms. The inverse
demand function is the following.
P = 1  q1   q2 (1)
1See, for example, Bernheim and Whinston (1990), Davidson and Deneckere (1990), Green
and Porter (1985), and more recently, Grassi (2014). For a survey on collusion in oligopolistic
market see Ivaldi et al. (2003).
2See, for example, Lazear (1990), Van Gompel (1995), Majumdar and Saha (1998),
Bertomeu (2007) and Lommerud and Straume (2012).
3A relevant exception is Vlassis and Varvataki (2014) who analyze a duopoly with di¤er-
entiated products and decentralized wage setting, where labor unions and rms bargain over
the wage. Di¤erently from us, they concentrate their analysis on the e¤ects of unions on the
collusion sustainability and the e¤ects on social welfare.
where q1 and q2 are the rms outputs while P is the output market price.
We assume that rms use labor li with i = 1; 2, as the only input in a
production function with constant return to scale, and that for simplicity, the
level of production qi is equal to the input li:
qi = q(li) = li (2)
Thus, the rms cost function is
Ci = wli (3)
where w is the wage.
The labor market determines the equilibrium wage w. The demand curve,
Dl, is completely anelastic, and given by the sum of the rms conditioned input
demands, l1(q1) and l2(q2): The supply curve, Sl is linear and increasing in w.
Thus, we have
Dl = l1(q1) + l2(q2) = q1 + q2 (4)
Sl : wS = w0 + bSl
with w0; b  0 .
Notice that when b = 0 the supply curve is innitely elastic, and its elasticity
decreases when b increases. Assuming for simplicity w0 = 0; the equilibrium
wage is the following.
w = b(q1 + q2) (5)
Therefore, we assume that rms contract their employees period by period,
and we exclude any type of bargaining, and ring costs.4 The rm 1s prot
function is the following.
1 = P (q1; q2)q1   C1 (6)
= (1  q1   q2)q1   b(q1 + q2)q1 (7)
Notice that, although we assume constant return to scale, we obtain a cost
function quadratic with respect to the rms output and linear with respect
to the competitors output. In particular, @C1=@q2 = bq1 > 0 measures the
negative impact (indirect production diseconomy) of the rm 2s output on the
rm 1s prot. In other words, the higher it is the output of rm 2, the higher
the total cost of production of rm 1 is.
2.1 One-shot Nash Equilibrium
The Cournot Nash equilibrium (labelled by CN), is the following.
qCN1 = q
CN
2 =
1
3(1 + b)
(8)
4This implies that in any period li = qi:
In equilibrium, price, prots and wage, are
PCN =
1
3
3b+ 1
b+ 1
(9)
CN1 = 
CN
2 =
1
9 (1 + b)
(10)
wCN =
2b
3(1 + b)
(11)
it is easy to check that the price of the output (9) and the wage (11) are
increasing in b, while prots (10) and quantities (8) are decreasing in b.
3 Collusion in a supergame
Following Friedman (1971), we investigate collusion sustainability using trigger
strategies in a supergame framework: we compare the expected prots by col-
lusion with the ones obtained in case of unilateral deviation, and compute the
critical discount factor for the industry such that rms are indi¤erent between
colluding and deviating.
Colluding, rms maximize the joint prot function, 1+2, and internalize
the negative production externality. In equilibrium we obtain
qColl1 = q
Coll
2 =
1
4 (b+ 1)
(12)
PColl =
1
2
(2b+ 1)
(b+ 1)
(13)
Coll1 = 
Coll
2 =
1
8 (b+ 1)
(14)
wColl =
b
2 (b+ 1)
= 2bqColl1 (15)
it is easy to check that the price of the output (13) and the wage (15) are
increasing in b, while prots (14) and quantities (12) are decreasing in b.
3.1 Incentive to deviate
In order to expand its output with respect to the collusive one, the cheater rm
has to hire new employees o¤ering them higher wages, wd. The equilibrium
wage wd is determined such that the additional demand by the cheater rm,
qd1   q
Coll
1 ; matches the residual supply of labor. Then, we have
wd = b(ld1 + l
Coll
2 ) = b(q
d
1 + q
Coll
2 ) (16)
where the apex d labels any deviation variables.
Thus, since qd > qColl; the cheaters cost function becomes
Cd1 = w
CollqColl1 + w
d
 
qd1   q
Coll
1

(17)
Substituting (15), (16) and (17) in the rm 1s prot function (6) ; we obtain
d1 = (1  q
d
1   q
Coll
2 )q
d
1   2b
 
qColl1
2
  b(qd1   q
Coll
1 )(q
Coll
2 + q
d
1) (18)
where qd = argmaxq1 
d
1.
In the deviation phase, we obtain the following quantity, prot and wage
qd1 =
1
8
(4b+ 3)
(b+ 1)
2 (19)
d1 =
 
20b+ 12b2 + 9

64 (b+ 1)
3 (20)
wd =
1
8
(6b+ 5) b
(b+ 1)
2 (21)
where
qd1   q
Coll
1 =
1
8
(2b+ 1)
(b+ 1)
2 > 0
In this case,
d1  
Coll
1 =
1
64
(2b+ 1)
2
(b+ 1)
3 > 0 (22)
d1  
CN
1 =
1
576
 
52b+ 44b2 + 17

(b+ 1)
3 > 0 (23)
Finally, the critical discount factor is
CN =
d1  
Coll
1
d1  
CN
1
= 9
(2b+ 1)
2
52b+ 44b2 + 17
(24)
where
8b 2 R+; CN < 1
Proposition 1 The rms have not incentive to deviate if they are su¢ciently
patient, i.e. 1; 2  
CN :
Proof. Comparing the expect prot by collusion and by deviation, it is easy to
check that no rm has a unilateral incentive to deviate if and only if 1; 2 
CN =
d
1
 Coll
1
d
1
 CN
1
= 9 (2b+1)
2
52b+44b2+17 :
Proposition 2 Collusion is harder to sustain when the slope of the labor supply
function is higher
Proof. It is easy to check that @
CN
@b
= 144
 
52b+ 44b2 + 17
 2
(2b+ 1) (b+ 1) >
0; i.e., the discount factor is increasing in b:
3.2 Incentive to punish
Collusion sustainability requires that, after deviation, the cheated rm punishes
the cheater one, expanding its production with respect to the collusive outcome.
However, since the labor supply curve is upward-sloping, this causes an increase
in wages, decreasing punishment protability. When the Cournot Nash prot,
CN2 , is lower than the prot obtained when cheated, 
 d
2 , no rm has incentive
to punish deviation; then, deviation always occurs. Anticipating that, no rm
has incentive to collude, and thus collusion is never sustainable.5
 d2 = 2(q
d
1 ; q
Coll
2 ) =
1
32
6b+ 4b2 + 3
(b+ 1)
3 (25)
CN2  
 d
2 =  
1
288
4b2   10b  5
(b+ 1)
3 (26)
where  d labels the cheated rm.
From equation (25) we obtain that CN2   
 d
2  0 only if b  2:9271 = b;
i.e., starting the punishment phase is protable only when the sensitivity of
the wage to the input demand is not so high. On the contrary, when b > b,
punishment is not credible and no deviation would be punished. Thus, rms
always deviate from the collusive outcome, and, anticipating that, collusion is
never sustainable.
Proposition 3 Punishing any deviation is credible if and only if b  b:
Proof. It follows from equation (25) :
3.3 Collusion sustainability
Theorem 4 Collusion is sustainable as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if
and only if:
- both rms are su¢ciently patient, i.e. 1; 2  
CN ;
- punishing any deviation is credible, i.e. b  b:
Proof. The Theorem 4 follows from Propositions 1 and 3.
Figures (1) and (2) illustrate Theorem (4). Notice that, when the parameter
of the slope of the labor supply b is higher than a threshold value b, the critical
discount factor is a¤ected by a discontinuity jump and reaches its maximum
value; i.e., CN = 1.
5The critical discount factor (24) becomes CN =
 

d
1
 
Coll
1

=0!1.
Figure 1: The cheated rms incentive to punish deviation, CN   d:
Figure 2: The critical discount factor CN required to sustain collusion in func-
tion of b:
4 Conclusion
When the labor supply is not innitely elastic and the wage is not exogenously
given, any variation in the industry labor demand a¤ects all rms marginal
costs. That is, any variation of the output of a rm causes a twofold e¤ect on
its own total costs. First, an increase in the output increases the input demand.
Second, an increase in the input demand increases the input price. The lat-
ter e¤ect increases all rms production costs, as well, and is internalized when
rms collude, reducing the unilateral incentive to expand production. Collusion
sustainability in a supergame à la Friedman (1971) requires the cheated rm
to punish the cheater one after any deviation by increasing production. When
expanding production is too expensive, it is not protable to start the punish-
ment phase; in this case, punishing any deviation is not credible, and collusion
is not sustainable.
Rigidity in the input market that reduces elasticity of the input supply, may
be due to some bargaining power, and may depend on the presence of unions,
or high market concentration. These elements are usually considered as welfare
decreasing; on the contrary, our model shows that, making collusion not sustain-
able, they may have an unwanted positive e¤ect on the market competitiveness
and the social welfare.6 It would be relevant to deeply analyze the e¤ect of
factors that a¤ect the sensitivity of equilibrium wage to labor demand, such
as the presence of employment protection legislation, unions, buyer bargaining
power, ring costs, multiperiod contracts, etc., on collusion sustainability and
social welfare. Analogously, some characteristics of the downstream market such
as asymmetries or product di¤erentiation could be relevant. These extensions
indicate the development of our analysis.
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